Record Detail

The paper focuses upon a neglected area of EU merger control, theacquisition of minority shareholdings that have the potential to cause competitiveharm at the European Union level, and which therefore should be vetted under EUlaw. Using economic theory and actual cases vetted by European Regulators, thepaper demonstrates an EU regulatory enforcement gap in respect of the aforesaidminority shareholdings. The Commission’s recent proposal to end this gap, the so-called targeted transparency system, is then critically explored, revealing that theproposed system suffers from the same problem as the EU merger control regime inrespect of mergers with a potential community competition concern: neither canguarantee that nearly all the said mergers and minority shareholdings cases wouldbe vetted under EU law. Therefore, an alternative more cooperative approach,which guarantees that virtually all such cases would come under EU law, is putforward. The more cooperative approach concerning mergers is discussed first, asthe approach toward minority shareholdings is an extension of it, establishing anintegrated approach. The paper demonstrates how this approach would guaranteethat virtually all mergers with a potential community competition concern wouldcome under EU law, leading to a number of positives: the near elimination of themisallocation problem and associated issues, in addition to streamlining the oper-ation of the said architecture. Thereafter, the paper reveals how the more cooper-ative approach ensures that virtually all minority shareholdings with a potential tocause competitive harm at the EU level would be vetted under EU law, not onlyending this enforcement gap but also leading to an architecture that is morestreamlined than would be the case if the Commission’s proposal became law. It is,of course, recognised that the more cooperative approach does not add