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Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning
inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we
argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences, but
between properties and categories. We outline a new approach to induction that is
based on two theses. The first thesis is epistemological. We submit that there is not only
knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but also knowledge-what. Knowledge-what con-
cerns relations between properties and categories and we argue that it cannot be
reduced to knowledge-that. We support the partition of knowledge by mapping it onto
the long-term memory systems: procedural, semantic and episodic memory. The
second thesis is that the role of inductive reasoning is to generate knowledge-what.
We use conceptual spaces to model knowledge-what and the relations between prop-
erties and categories involved in induction.