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In a recent paper in this journal, Gideon Yaffe provides an expected utilitymodel of culpability in order to explain why willfully ignorant misconduct sometimes isjust as culpable as knowing misconduct. Although promising, I argue here that challengesremain for Yaffe’s view. First, I argue that Yaffe’s proof of the equal culpability of willfulignorance and knowledge is not watertight in certain realistic cases. Next, I argue thatYaffe’s view of culpability is motive-sensitive in a way that sits uncomfortably withcriminal law doctrine, and I show that his view has difficulty with unjustified actions thatare nonetheless privileged. Perhaps these problems can be solved by modifying Yaffe’saccount using the notion of legally recognized reasons. However, I argue that difficultiesremain when it comes to implementing this solution into Yaffe’s mathematical model.Finally, I raise concerns about Yaffe’s account of willful ignorance in particular. While hisview initially seems to have a major advantage over the additive picture of willful igno-rance I’ve defended, this advantage does not stand up under scrutiny. In fact, Yaffe likelyrelies (albeit covertly) on an additive metaphysical picture of willful ignorance as well.