Current legal practice holds that a diagnosis of psychopathy does not remove
criminal responsibility. In contrast, many philosophers and legal experts are increasingly
persuaded by evidence from experimental psychology and neuroscience indicating moral
and cognitive deficits in psychopaths and have argued that they should be excused from
moral responsibility. However, having opposite views concerning psychopaths’ moral
responsibility, on the one hand, and criminal responsibility, on the other, seems unfortunate
given the assumption that the law should, at least to some extent, react to the same desertbased
considerations as do ascriptions of moral responsibility. In response, Stephen Morse
has argued that the law should indeed be reformed so as to excuse those with severe
psychopathy from blame, but that psychopaths that have committed criminal offences
should still be subject to some legal repercussions such as civil commitment. We argue that
consequentialist and norm-expressivist considerations analogous to those that support
punishing psychopaths or at least retaining some legal liability, might also be drawn on in
favour of holding psychopaths morally accountable.

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• On Blaming and Punishing Psychopaths