Alon Harel defines extreme cases as those in which the only way to avert adestructive threat is to harm innocent people. He rejects traditional consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches because of the type of reasoning they both employ. I interpretHarel asmakingtwocentral objectionstothisformofreasoning.First, traditionalapproachesrequire comparisons to be made about the value of human life. Second, decisions in extremecases, even if permissible, should not be made under the guidance of rules. I argue that theseobjections, thoughprima facieplausible, are on reflection relatively weak, and I offer insteada more moderate argument that vindicates Harel’s general thesis that deliberation is morallyrelevant. More specifically, I argue that whether one acts on certain conditions affects boththe moral permissibility of one’s actions and the duties owed by othe

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• Alon Harel on How to Deliberate Permissibly