We study how payoffs and network structure affect reaching the payoff-dominant
equilibrium in a 2 × 2 coordination game that actors play with their neighbors in a network.
Using an extensive simulation analysis of over 100,000 networks with 2–25 actors, we show
that the importance of network characteristics is restricted to a limited part of the payoff
space. In this part, we conclude that the payoff-dominant equilibrium is chosen more often if
network density is larger, the network is more centralized, and segmentation of the network
is smaller. Moreover, it is more likely that heterogeneity in behavior persists if the network
is more segmented and less centralized. Persistence of heterogeneous behavior is not related
to network density

EB00000002778K

Available

• Effects of Network Characteristics on Reaching the Payoff-Dominant Equilibrium in Coordination Games: A Simulation study