RACT. This paper assesses normative arguments regarding four views aboutdefamatory meaning. The moralised view holds that a statement about a person isdefamatory if and only if we ought to think less of that person if the statement istrue. The nonmoralised view holds that a statement is defamatory if and only ifpeople in fact think less of the subject on hearing the statement. A third - the dualview - can be split into two versions. The first version holds that a statement isdefamatory if and only if it satisfies either the moralised or non-moralised views.The second version holds that statements satisfying either view can be defamatory,but they ought to be considered fundamentally different forms of personaldefamation, with different remedies, defences and conditions of liability attached.Both the moralised and non-moralised views are rejected because they fail toacknowledge instrumental and intrinsic reputational value respectively. The firstversion of the dual view is rejected because it compromises the expressive value ofdefamation, implausibly suggests that truth should be a general defence and fails torecognise that different objections apply to the moralised and nonmoralised views.The upshot is that we ought to accept the second version of the dual

EB00000002898K			Available
EB00000002899K			Available

• HE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF DEFAMATORYMEANING