Stephen Morse’s illuminating scholarship on law and neuroscience relies on a
‘‘folk psychological’’ account of human behavior in order to defend the law’s foundations
for ascribing legal responsibility. The heart of Morse’s account is the notion of ‘‘mental
state causation,’’ in which mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, and intentions) cause
behavior. Morse argues that causation of this sort is necessary to support legal responsibility.
We challenge this claim. First, we discuss problems with the conception of mental
causation on which Morse appears to rely. Second, we present an alternative account to
explain the link between mental states, reasons, and actions (the ‘‘rational–teleological’’
account). We argue that the alternative account avoids the conceptual problems that arise
for Morse’s conception of mental causation and that it also undergirds ascriptions of legal
responsibility. If the alternative succeeds, then Morse’s conception of ‘‘mental state causation’’
is not necessary to support legal responsibility.

EB00000004034K			Available
EB00000004036K			Available

• Morse, Mind, and Mental Causation