hina’s public enforcement regime has long been blamed for insuffi-ciently and ineffectively deterring securities crime. We collect data on publicenforcement outcomes from documents disclosed by listed firms and find that lawenforcement outputs have increased significantly since 2011, thanks to the efforts ofthe China Securities Regulatory Commission’s 38 regional offices. However, due tothe lack of a reliable private enforcement regime and the limitations of monetarypenalties, the general enforcement of securities law is still regarded as weak. Inaddition, there exists a salient pattern of selective enforcement. Privately ownedlisted firms face a harsher regulatory environment in terms of both the number andseverity of sanctions from regulators, whereas state-owned, and particularly central-government-controlled firms enjoy the most favourable treatment, although the gaphas been reduced in recent year

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• n Empirical Analysis of the Public Enforcementof Securities Law in China: Finding the Missing Pieceof the Puzzle