von Fintel (Curr Stud Linguist Ser 36:123–152, 2001) and Gillies (Linguist
Philos 30(3): 329–360, 2007) have proposed a dynamic strict conditional
account of counterfactuals as an alternative to the standard variably strict account
due to Stalnaker (Studies in logical theory, Blackwell, London, 1968) and Lewis
(Counterfactuals, Blackwell, London, 1973). Von Fintel’s view is motivated largely
by so-called reverse Sobel sequences, about which the standard view seems to make
the wrong predictions. (The other major motivation is data surrounding so-called
negative polarity items, which I do not discuss here.) More recently Moss (Nouˆs 46
(3):561–586, 2012) has offered a pragmatic/epistemic explanation that purports to
explain the data without requiring abandonment of the standard view So far the
small amount of subsequent literature has focused primarily on the original class of
cases motivating the strict conditional view What is needed in the debate is an
examination of the predictions of the dynamic strict conditional account for a
broader range of data. I undertake this task here presenting a slew of cases that are
problematic for the strict conditional view but not for Moss’s view and considering
some possible responses Ultimately I take my contribution to constitute a signifi-
cant blow to the dynamic strict conditional view, though not a decisive verdict
against it.

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• Strict conditional accounts of counterfactuals