Many criminal law scholars have criticized the responsible corporate officer
doctrine as a form of strict and vicarious liability. It is neither. It is merely a doctrine that
supplies a duty in instances of omissions. Siding with Todd Aagaard in this debate, I argue
that a proper reading of the cases yields that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is
just duty supplying, and does not allow for strict liability when the underlying statute
requires mens rea. After analyzing Dotterweich, Park, and their progeny, I probe the
depths of this duty-supplying doctrine, including to whom the duty is owed, whether the
duty is grounded in statute, cause of peril, or contract, and what the content of the duty is.
Although the responsible corporate officer doctrine unveils questions we may have about
duty generally, it is no more problematic than other duty-supplying doctrines in the
criminal law.

EB00000004119K

Available

• Probing the Depths of the Responsible Corporate Officer’s Duty