Courts and commentators are notoriously puzzled about the mens reastandards for complicity. Accomplices intend to aid, but what attitude need they havetowards the crimes that they aid? This paper both criticizes extant accounts of themens rea of complicity and offers a new account. The paper argues that an intentioncan commit one to an event’s occurrence without committing one to promoting theevent, or making it more likely to take place. Under the proposed account of themens rea of complicity, an accomplice must have an intention that commits him tothe crime’s occurrence, but need not commit him to making it more likely that thecrime occurs. The paper traces the implications of this view both for several difficultcomplicity cases, and for ongoing debates among philosophers of action about thenecessary and sufficient conditions of joint agency.

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• INTENDING TO AID