CT. This paper has a threefold purpose: first, to criticize the customaryapplication of Hohfeld’s theory of rights to Hobbes’s juridical/political theory thatreduces all Hobbesian rights to Hohfeldian privileges; second, to defend theappropriateness of a proper application of a Hohfeldian analysis of rights toHobbes’s theory by responding to criticisms offered by Eleanor Curran; and, lastly,to reveal the value a Hohfeldian analysis offers in clarifying a Hobbesian right thathas been generally misunderstood in the literature. I argue that a Hohfeldiananalysis helps make sense of the complex juridical relationships between thesovereign, the perpetrator of crime, and the victim of crime involved in Hobbes’streatment of the sovereign’s right to puni

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• A HOHFELDIAN ANALYSIS OF HOBBESIAN RIGHTS