We analyze the optimal harvesting rule of a monopolist in a managed singlespecies fishery environment where we allow the fishery control to be imperfect. The monopolist’s control action consists of legal and illegal actions. Illegal actions might be detected at random times, in which case the monopolist is subject to a deterrence scheme in line with the Common Fishery Policy implemented by the European Union We show that the introduction of the management policy, together with the inability of the regulator to perfectly monitor fishing activities, creates an incentive to harvest not only beyond the allowed quota, but also beyond the harvest in an unregulated but otherwise equal situation. This effect is particularly pronounced at lower levels of the legal quota. We also show that, if the monopolist is sufficiently impatient, overharvesting with severe depletion of the resource might even occur under a reinforced deterrence scheme that considers the permanent withdrawal of the fishing license.

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